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to note because the no-extension rule appears not in the text
of section 205, but in judicial interpolation. And even if the
original period of limitations is still alive, so that the plaintiff
does not require a section 205 extension, he would still suffer
prejudice, e.g., the loss of witnesses or their failure to recollect.
In another recent case, Vazzano v. Horn,2 17 the court held
that although the Revisers did not anticipate that rule 3211(b)
would be used to dispose of a dispute over service, the motion
must be held to lie in order to avoid the consequence of the long
delay that would result if the objection, taken by answer rather
than by motion at the defendant's option, were not reached until
trial.
Note also that the court permits affidavits and other proof
on the motion, which means, very simply, that the defense need
not (despite the language of rule 3211(b), which might be construed to the contrary) be defective on its face. Thus, rule
3211(b) may test the factual or evidentiary basis, as well as
the legal bases, -of the defense or claim.218 This case resolves
one of the most serious dilemmas initially posed by the CPLR.
Motion to Dismiss for Nonjoinder of an Indispensable Party
In Polar Distribs., Inc. v. Granger Realty Corp.,219 which
involved an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien, defendant moved
to dismiss the complaint on the ground, inter alia, that the court
should not proceed in the absence of a person who should have
been made a party.220 The court denied defendant's motion and
held that before a motion to dismiss for nonjoinder of an indispensable party pursuant to Rule 3211(a) (10) of the CPLR
may be granted, it is a condition precedent that the defendant
make a prior motion to have the indispensable party joined in
the action.
Under prior practice a motion to dismiss the complaint for
nonjoinder could not be made in the first instance. 22'
Two
motions were necessary. Defendant had to move, first, for an
order directing theoplaintiff to join the omitted party within a
specified time and if such order was not complied with, he might
afterwards move, second, to dismiss the complaint.222 It was
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required that the defendant make the motion to add the omitted
party even if the order directing the party to be added was futile
in that the absent party was clearly not subject to 223
the jurisdiction
of the court and had refused to appear voluntarily.
Since the avowed intent of the Revisers was the avoidance
of delay caused by multiplicity of motions, one might assume
that the CPLR would change this procedure, and allow a motion
to dismiss for nonjoinder in such instance to be made immediately.
There is no specific provision in the CPLR which makes a
motion for joinder of the indispensable party a condition precedent
to a rule 3211 (a) (10) motion to dismiss on grounds of nonjoinder.2 24 It is apparent that a rule 3211(a) (10) motion could
be conditionally granted.2 25 The court in such an order would
allow a reasonable time for the absent party to be joined, after
which time the order would become absolute (and the action would
be dismissed) unless an extension was granted.
If it appears at the very outset, however, that the action
cannot continue without the party; that such party is not subject
to the jurisdiction of the court; and that he has refused to appear
voluntarily, the court should order immediate dismissal.
The court in the instant case interpreted the CPLR as retaining the dual-motion procedure of the CPA. Such motion
practice results in unnecessary delay. The decision appears to
give the relevant CPLR provisions a construction they were not
intended to have. 226 The dual-motion procedure should not be
required in circumstances where it serves no useful purpose.
Motion to Dismiss for Want of Prosecution
Rule 3216 of the CPLR, which provides for the dismissal
of a complaint for failure to prosecute an action, has become
a strong source of controversy recently. The storm center is
the first department case of Sortino v. Fisher,227 which will be
treated at length shortly.
Where the plaintiff has unreasonably delayed in pressing his
claim to adjudication, the court, on its own initiative or upon
motion, may dismiss the complaint. 228 No particular period of
delay is required; if it is substantial on the facts of the case it is
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